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The Defamation You Can't Refuse:
Section 315's Prohibition on Censoring
Political Broadcasts
by
MARTIN KASSMAN*
Introduction
Justice William 0. Douglas was fond of pointing out that the
Founding Fathers cast the first amendment "in absolute terms." 1 The
first amendment commands as follows: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging freedom of speech, or of the press... ,2 United States citizens
do not, however, enjoy absolute freedom of speech. Subject to certain
limitations, Congress and the states may punish certain types of speech.
These include obscenity,3 "fighting words,"4 defamation,5 speech aimed
at and likely to produce imminent lawless action,6 and even commercial
solicitation by professionals."
A similar disparity exists between the promise of statutory language
and the reality of case law regarding broadcasters' freedom of expression.
Section 326 of the Communications Act states,
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
[Federal Communications] Commission the power of censorship over
the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication.8
This seems like a hands-off policy. But if the free speech rights of
most people are less than absolute, the rights of radio and television
broadcasters are even narrower. For example, the Supreme Court held
in 1978 that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may pun-
ish a licensee for broadcasting material that is not obscene but merely
* Associate, Cooper, White & Cooper, San Francisco. B.S., Arkansas State University,
1982; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1988.
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
5. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
"indecent." 9 In 1987, the FCC issued a Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der adopting an expanded concept of indecency."° Since then, the FCC
has conducted a vigorous campaign against allegedly indecent
broadcasts. "
Thus, broadcasters are burdened with a responsibility to censor
what they broadcast. If they engage in the aforementioned kinds of
speech, or possibly others-for example, revealing military secrets' 2-
they may be punished through administrative, civil, and criminal sanc-
tions. Yet in one situation, broadcasters not only do not have to censor
what they air-they may not. That situation, the subject of this Article,
arises when a candidate for public office "uses" a station to advertise his
campaign pursuant to section 315 of the Communications Act. 13 Section
315 provides, in relevant part,
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsec-
tion upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such
candidate. '
4
The remainder of subsection (a) provides that "bona fide" newscasts,
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot news event cover-
9. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10. In re Pacifica Found., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd 2698,
para. 12, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1194, para. 12 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the FCC's expanded
definition. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1337-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
11. See, e.g., FCC Gets Copy of WGBH-TV Mapplethorpe Broadcast, BROADCASTING,
Aug. 20, 1990, at 59.
12. Cf Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988). The voice or image of the candidate must appear in order for
the censorship prohibition to apply. E.g., Letter from William B. Ray, Chief, Complaints and
Compliance Division for Chief, Broadcast Bureau, to Mr. Patton Echols, 43 F.C.C.2d 479, 481
(1973). As to political presentations that consist entirely of others appearing on a candidate's
behalf, "licensees are free to exercise their good faith judgment as to what particular material
will best serve the public interest." Id. (refusing action against station that pulled allegedly
false political commercial off the air); see Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d
1, 6 (3d Cir. 1950) (stations that broadcast speeches by candidate's supporters could not assert
censorship prohibition as defense in defamation action). This explains the advent of political
television commercials in which a tiny image of the candidate appears briefly in a comer of the
screen, and political radio commercials in which the candidate's voice is heard at the end
stating who paid for the commercial.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988) (emphasis in original). The FCC has disavowed any au-
thority to itself "censor any material contained within political spots which are deemed a
'use.'" Letter from William B. Ray, Chief, Complaints and Compliance Division for Chief,
Broadcast Bureau, to Mr. Alan S. Burstein, 43 F.C.C.2d 590, 591 (1973); see Letter from
Wallace E. Johnson, Chief, Broadcast Bureau, to Julian Bond, Atlanta NAACP, 69 F.C.C.2d
943, 944 (1978).
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age do not constitute "uses" of broadcasting stations. Since broadcasters
rarely give free time to politicians except in a news context, that leaves
paid political advertisements as the primary focus of section 315.15
The FCC and the courts have been faced with a number of questions
about the meaning of section 315's censorship prohibition: Must broad-
casters permit politicians to air material that is defamatory, or is inde-
cent, or may incite violence? Can a person harmed by a political
broadcast sue the broadcaster instead of, or in addition to, the offending
politician? This Article examines the interesting cases which have raised
such questions and suggests a statutory change to clarify the situation.
I
Defamation
The major case on defamatory political broadcasts, Farmers Educa-
tional & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 6 did not involve an adver-
tisement. The allegedly defamatory broadcast consisted of a candidate's
speech, and the court opinions do not mention any payment for the
broadcast. 7
The WDAY case grew out of a 1956 United States Senate race in
North Dakota. Two of the candidates made speeches over WDAY's tel-
evision airwaves. WDAY felt compelled by section 315 to permit a third
candidate, A.C. Townley, to broadcast an uncensored speech as a reply
to his opponents' speeches. 8 In the broadcast, Townley accused his op-
ponents of taking orders from the Farmers Union, which he said was
trying to "establish a Communist Farmers Union Soviet right here in
North Dakota." 9 The union filed a libel complaint in state court against
Townley and WDAY. The trial court dismissed the complaint against
WDAY, and the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed, both on the
ground that section 315 compelled WDAY to broadcast Townley's re-
15. This section also applies to cable television systems. 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1988). The
term "broadcasters," as used in this Article, generally applies to cable operators as well as
licensees of radio and television stations, except that cable operators are not subject to FCC
sanctions for indecent programming at the present time.
16. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
17. Id. at 526; Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D.
1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). Today, an unpaid broadcast of a candidate's speech might,
under certain circumstances, be considered on-the-spot news coverage. See Political Primer
1984, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, paras. 48-59 (1984) (FCC staff update of primer adopted by Com-
mission in 1978). The WDA Y case arose before Congress exempted news broadcasts from
§ 315. In any event, the WDA Y circumstances probably would not qualify for the news
exemption.
18. WDA Y, 89 N.W.2d at 104. The television station, believing that some of Townley's
statements were false, refused to broadcast his speech unless he made a demand under section
315. Accordingly, Townley made the demand. Id. at 104, 109.
19. Id. at 104.
1990] CENSORING POLITICAL BROADCAST
marks and that it immunized WDAY from liability for the alleged defa-
mation.20 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.21
By the narrowest possible margin of five Justices to four, the Court
handed the Farmers Union another defeat: The North Dakota Supreme
Court's judgment was affirmed. Justice Black's majority opinion first
held that section 315 required broadcasters to refrain from censoring de-
famatory remarks in political broadcasts. No evidence existed that Con-
gress intended to give the word "censorship" a narrower meaning in
section 315 than the "commonly understood" meaning, which was "any
examination of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of
'objectionable' material.",22 The Court cited legislative history, including
Senate committee comments on section 326,23 as evidence that Congress
harbored "a deep hostility to censorship either by the Commission or by
a licensee."24 The Court emphasized "that permitting a broadcasting
station to censor allegedly libelous remarks would undermine the basic
purpose for which section 315 was passed-full and unrestricted discus-
sion of political issues by legally qualified candidates. '25 Justice Black
wrote persuasively of the dangers such censorship could entail:
Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible for the broadcast of
libelous material, all remarks even faintly objectionable would be ex-
cluded out of an excess of caution. Moreover, if any censorship were
permissible, a station so inclined could intentionally inhibit a candi-
date's legitimate presentation under the guise of lawful censorship of
libelous matter.
The Court was unanimous on this initial holding; the dissenters agreed
"that WDAY could not have lawfully deleted from A.C. Townley's
broadcast his defamation of petitioner."
27
The Justices disagreed on whether section 315 granted licensees im-
munity from liability for broadcasting defamatory statements they were
prohibited from censoring. Disputes abounded regarding the equities in-
volved in determining the existence or nonexistence of station immunity.
Justice Black wrote that denying immunity to licensees would have
"the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal lia-
bility to be imposed for the very conduct the statute demands of the li-
20. Id. at 105-10. One of the five state supreme court judges dissented, arguing that Con-
gress had not intended to prohibit broadcasters from censoring remarks that defamed non-
candidates. Id. at 110-12 (Morris, J., dissenting).
21. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 358 U.S. 810 (1958).
22. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527 (1959) (emphasis in
original).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988), quoted supra text accompanying note 8.
24. WDA Y 360 U.S. at 528 & n.6.
25. Id. at 529.
26. Id. at 530.
27. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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censee."2 Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, admitted that such a result might be
unfair. "But there may be unfairness too, after all, in depriving a de-
famed individual of recovery against the agency by which the defamatory
communication was magnified in its deleterious effect on his ability to
earn a livelihood."2 9 The dissent ignored the possibility that a libel vic-
tim still could recover from the candidate who perpetrated the libel.30
Justice Frankfurter presented a more solid argument when he
pointed out that the issue was statutory interpretation, not fairness. "We
are dealing with political power, not ethical imperatives."3 " According
to the dissent, the question was not "whether a particular result would be
'unconscionable' but whether the result is or is not barred by federal leg-
islation as construed and applied in accordance with settled principles of
statutory and constitutional adjudication."3 2 Any adjustments for the
sake of fairness, Frankfurter wrote in dissent, should be accomplished by
a congressional change in federal law or by changes in state libel laws.33
The Court noted that Congress had repeatedly declined to adopt
proposed amendments that would have either allowed broadcasters to
censor libelous statements or granted them an express immunity. "Thus,
whatever adverse inference may be drawn from the failure of Congress to
legislate an express immunity is offset by its refusal to permit stations to
avoid liability by censoring broadcasts."3 4 This reasoning is flawed. It
says that because Congress refused to allow censorship, Congress must
have believed that stations would not be liable for uncensored broadcasts.
In other words, Justice Black's argument assumes that Congress could
not possibly have intended that licensees should have tort liability for
acts required by section 315. The Court thereby assumed the very point
it was trying to demonstrate. The dissent found the Court's method of
arriving at congressional intent particularly inappropriate in this type of
case: "As we should go slow to read into what Congress has said the
negation of state power, unless it speaks explicitly or there is obvious
28. I at 531 (opinion of the Court).
29. Id. at 545 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. Of course, where the offending candidate has limited financial resources, the prospect
of recovering from him or her may be of little value to the victim. Counsel who argued for the
Farmers Union before the United States Supreme Court remembers that Townley had no
money, so that the union's only chance of being compensated was to recover from WDAY.
Telephone interview with Harriet F. Pilpel, Esq., of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, N.Y.
(Sept. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Pilpel Interview].
31. 360 U.S. at 542 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 536.
33. Id. at 545.
34. Id. at 532 (opinion of the Court).
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collision, we should even less willingly find such negation in what Con-
gress has frankly refused to say."35
The majority wrote that the FCC had "long interpreted [section]
315 as granting stations an immunity."36 The Court added that "with
full knowledge of the Commission's interpretation Congress has since
made significant additions to that section without amending it to depart
from the Commission's view."'37 The dissent viewed the history differ-
ently. Justice Frankfurter wrote that the FCC had not been consistent
on this issue.3' He indicated that even if it had been consistent, a holding
that section 315 rendered stations immune from defamation liability
would not be an administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute
but would be "a ruling of constitutional law-that the [s]upremacy
[c]lause requires that the existence of the Communications Act of 1934
oust the [s]tates of jurisdiction to impose libel laws upon broadcasts
made under the provisions of [section] 315. Such constitutional rulings
are for this Court and not for administrative agencies." 39 Moreover, ac-
cording to the dissent, the legislative history negated rather than sup-
ported the conclusion that Congress acquiesced in FCC dictum on the
immunity question.' Evidence existed to support both the majority and
the dissent. The Court's summation on this point is appealing: "In light
of this contradictory legislative background we do not feel compelled to
reach a result which seems so in conflict with traditional concepts of
fairness. 41
The heart of the dissenting opinion in WDA Y is Justice Frank-
furter's conviction that the Court unnecessarily found a conflict between
state and federal laws, so that the state law had to bow under the
supremacy clause. 42 The dissenters wrote, "States should not be held to
have been ousted from power traditionally held in the absence of either a
clear declaration by Congress that it intends to forbid the continued
functioning of the state law or an obvious and unavoidable conflict be-
tween the federal and state directives. '4 3 Congress had not made such a
35. Id. at 540 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 533 (opinion of the Court).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 538-39 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 537-38. For the relevant text of the supremacy clause, see infra note 42.
40. Id. at 539.
41. Id. at 533 (opinion of the Court).
42. "[The Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The majority opinion did
not mention the supremacy clause, but that clause provided the authority for the Court's un-
spoken assumption that Congress had the power to render broadcasters immune from state
defamation laws. See WDAY 360 U.S. at 540-41 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
43. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 541.
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clear declaration." As to whether a conflict between federal and state
law existed in this case, the dissenters asserted that general principles of
libel law would probably have resulted in a verdict for the broadcaster
anyway, since "WDAY's compelled broadcast of Townley's speech
lacked the necessary intent to communicate the defamation."4 Even if
WDAY's conduct were "prima facie tortious," a state court might rule
that WDAY was privileged.46 Justice Black discredited the latter argu-
ment in a footnote:
The North Dakota District Court . . . struck down a state statute
which would have granted WDAY an immunity as in violation of a
state constitutional provision saving to "every man" a court remedy
for any injury done his "person or reputation." In this situation we do
not think that the record justifies the inference that WDAY could have
obtained an immunity by calling it a privilege.47
The footnote also pointed out that the question was not what North Da-
kota courts would do but whether or not Congress intended that licen-
sees be liable under state defamation laws for "broadcasting in a way
required by federal law."48
Justice Frankfurter's arguments about state law were internally in-
consistent. In the penultimate sentence of his opinion he wrote, "In this
decision a state law is invalidated by hypothesizing congressional acqui-
escence and by supposing 'conflicting' state law which we cannot be cer-
tain exists.",49 If state law did not conflict with section 315, as the dissent
asserted, what state law did the Court invalidate? None. The Court did
not point to any specific North Dakota statute or court decision and in-
validate it. It merely held that section 315 had rendered WDAY im-
mune from liability to the plaintiff in this case. If North Dakota law
would also have immunized WDAY, then the Court did not invalidate
North Dakota law.
Even assuming that North Dakota law would have rendered
WDAY liable, the dissenters did not believe that "displacement of state
power" was justified. 0 "If North Dakota were to rule that its libel law
applies to broadcasts made under compulsion of [section] 315, it would
rule that broadcasters are liable without fault. There is nothing in such
liability which conflicts with the necessity of broadcasting imposed by
44. Id.
45. Id. at 542.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 534 n.16 (opinion of the Court).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 546-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 544.
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[section] 315."'5l The point is a poor one. No one, including a broad-
caster, should be punished for conduct compelled by law.52
The plaintiff union argued that WDAY did not need immunity be-
cause it could protect itself either by obtaining insurance or by refusing
all politicians' requests for airtime so that section 315 could not be in-
voked. The Court gave the insurance argument the fleeting attention it
deserved." As to refusing all requests for political air time, Justice Black
correctly noted that "the thrust of [section] 315 is to facilitate political
debate over radio and television" and that the FCC considered carrying
political broadcasts to be an important element of the public service re-
quired of licensees.54 "Certainly Congress knew the obvious-that if a
licensee could protect himself from liability in no other way but by refus-
ing to broadcast candidates' speeches, the necessary effect would be to
hamper the congressional plan to develop broadcasting as a political out-
let, rather than to foster it."' 55 The repeated failure of Congress to explic-
itly immunize broadcasters raises some doubt as to whether or not
Congress knew the obvious, but the Court's policy argument is sound.
The constitutionality of section 315 could have been questioned in
the WDA Y case. The broadcaster could have argued that forcing it to act
in a way that made it liable in tort violated due process. The union could
have asserted that depriving it of a recovery against WDAY violated due
process.56 Neither party, however, challenged the statute's constitution-
ality in the Supreme Court. 5 7
51. Id. at 545. At the time WDA Y was decided, some states imposed strict liability for
defamation. Today, finding a broadcaster "liable without fault" would be unconstitutional on
first amendment grounds. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704 (1990).
It does not follow, however, that broadcaster liability in the WDA Y circumstances would vio-
late the first amendment. The broadcaster in that case believed that the statements in question
were false. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102, 104 (N.D. 1958),
aff'd, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). Thus, WDAY possessed the requisite "malice."
52. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2199 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("it would
be 'unconscionable' to conclude that obedience to an order remedying a Title VII violation
could subject a defendant to additional liability"); Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 899 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing WDAY, 360 U.S. at 533-35).
53. 360 U.S. at 534. Counsel for the Farmers Union still believes that, as between a
broadcaster that can and does insure itself and a defamed plaintiff with no other remedy, the
plaintiff should prevail as the innocent party less able to protect itself. Pilpel Interview, supra
note 30. In the author's view, however, whether or not a party is or can be insured should
have no bearing on its liability.
54. 360 U.S. at 534.
55. Id. at 535-36. For related argument, see infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
56. The union had made that argument unsuccessfully in the North Dakota courts.
Farmers's Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 89 N.W.2d 102, 106, 110 (N.D. 1958), aff'd, 360
U.S. 525 (1959).
57. M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 791 (3d ed. 1987).
But cf Morrisseau v. Mount Mansfield Television, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (D. Vt.
1974) (court erroneously states that WDA Y upheld constitutionality of section 315).
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Even after WDA Y, some broadcasters apparently remained in fear
of liability for defamation by candidates. In 1972, the Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS) radio and television stations in Los Angeles de-
manded that Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, a candidate for president in
the California primary, submit personally signed "indemnification
forms" before CBS would allow him to buy thirty-second spots.5 8
Humphrey challenged this requirement, and the FCC's Broadcast Bu-
reau59 ruled in his favor:
[W]e believe that an indemnification promise is likely to be inhibiting
with respect to the content of the candidate's use, as well as his deci-
sion on whether or not to use the station's facilities. In view of the
immunity afforded the licensee under WDA Y for a use by a candidate,
a requirement for indemnification appears to serve no appropriate pur-
pose; its attendant effect is therefore an unreasonable burden and re-
striction on the use of a station which is inconsistent with the no-
censorship requirement of [s]ection 315. 60
CBS petitioned the Commission for review, which was denied."
The Commission reiterated the Broadcast Bureau's analysis. CBS ar-
gued that, without indemnification, it could incur expenses of defending
lawsuits even if there were no liability. The FCC's reply was, in effect,
"tough luck."
We believe that the cost of defending a suit where there is no liability is
a part of the normal cost of doing business which a licensee assumes in
the operation of its station, whether or not the licensee may later have
a cause of action against the candidate whose conduct exposes the li-
censee to a lawsuit.6
2
A contrary decision arguably could have been consistent with the
letter of section 315. Not everyone would agree that requiring an indem-
nification agreement constitutes "censorship." Like WDAY, however,
the ruling makes sense in view of the policies behind section 315.
II
Incitement to Violence
While Humphrey was trying to reprise his role as the Democratic
presidential nominee, one J.B. Stoner sought the Democratic nomination
58. In addition to defamation, CBS expressed concern about possible liability for copy-
right infringement, invasion of privacy, or violation of union contracts. In re Complaint of D.
J. Leary, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 37 F.C.C.2d 576, para. 4 (1972).
59. The Broadcast Bureau no longer exists. Political broadcasting complaints now are
handled by the Mass Media Bureau. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(g) (1989).
60. Letter from William B. Ray, Chief, Complaints and Compliance Division for Chief,
Broadcast Bureau, to Gentlemen (In Re Complaint by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey), 35
F.C.C.2d 112, 113 (1972), review denied sub nom. In re Complaint of D. J. Leary, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 37 F.C.C.2d 576, para. 8 (1972).
61. In re Complaint of D. J. Leary, 37 F.C.C.2d at para. 8.
62. Id. para. 5.
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for U.S. Senator from Georgia. Stoner wanted to run radio and televi-
sion announcements with the following text:
I am J.B. Stoner. I am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for
the white people. I am the only candidate who is against integration.
All of the other candidates are race mixers to one degree or another. I
say we must repeal Gambrell's civil rights law. Gambrell's law takesjobs from us whites and gives those jobs to the niggers. The main rea-
son why niggers want integration is because the niggers want our white
women. I am for law and order with the knowledge that you cannot
have law and order and niggers too. Vote white. This time vote your
convictions by voting white racist J.B. Stoner into the run-off election
for U.S. Senator. Thank you. 6 3
The mayor of Atlanta, Sam Massell, issued an executive order urg-
ing broadcast stations not to accept advertising with such language on
the ground that it was calculated to incite listeners to violence." The
Atlanta office of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), joined by other organizations, asked the FCC
to advise licensees that they could decline to carry Stoner's announce-
ments without violating section 315.65 The Commission refused:
The relief requested in your letter would amount to an advance ap-
proval by the Commission of licensee censorship of a candidate's re-
marks .... Despite your report of threats of bombing and violence,
there does not appear to be that clear and present danger of imminent
violence which might warrant interfering with speech which does not
contain any direct incitement to violence. A contrary conclusion here
would permit anyone to prevent a candidate from exercising his rights
under [s]ection 315 by threatening a violent reaction. In view of the
precise commands of [s]ections 315 and 326, we are constrained to
deny your requests.66
It is worth noting that the Commission did not directly hold that
section 315 compelled broadcasters to air Stoner's announcements. It
merely refused to sanction such censorship in advance. However, the
opinion strongly suggests that any licensees heeding the mayor's warning
and refusing Stoner's ads would be in violation of section 315. Since that
section has no explicit exceptions based on content of the message, the
Commission was correct in its refusal to allow anything less than a seri-
ous danger of imminent violence to interfere with Stoner's access.
63. Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, by Direction of the Commission, to Mr. Lonnie
King, 36 F.C.C.2d 635, 636 (1972).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 637.
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III
Indecency/Obscenity
Six years later, Stoner ran for governor. He again ran radio and
television ads using the word "nigger." 67 The Atlanta NAACP again
asked the FCC to advise stations that they could refuse to carry such
announcements. 68 This time the NAACP had a new argument: the
word "nigger" was indecent or obscene and therefore could be banned
from the airwaves under the then-new Supreme Court decision in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation. 69
The Broadcast Bureau rejected the NAACP's argument. The
Pacifica holding supported broadcast regulations regarding patently of-
fensive language which dealt with sexual and excretory functions. The
FCC intended to interpret Pacifica narrowly. Consequently, the FCC
did not consider the word "nigger" as falling within the Pacifica hold-
ing.'° Moreover, Pacifica did not give the Commission general authority
to intervene whenever indecent words were broadcast.7" "Finally, even if
the Commission were to find the word 'nigger' to be 'obscene' or 'inde-
cent,' in light of [s]ection 315 we may not prevent a candidate from
utilizing that word during his 'use' of a licensee's broadcast facilities."72
Despite the FCC's new, tougher stance on indecency, the Bureau's
ruling that "nigger" is not an obscene or indecent word appears to be
good law today. Though the 1987 indecency order clearly states that in-
decency is not confined to George Carlin's "seven dirty words,"" inde-
cent speech still includes only words describing or depicting "sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner."' 74 Obscen-
ity is an even narrower category, including only certain sexual material. 7
The use of the word "nigger" may be patently offensive, but unless the
context involves sex or excretion, it is not indecent or obscene by the
FCC's standards.
The Bureau's dictum suggesting that section 315 would prevent cen-
sorship of obscene or indecent language is doubtful. In 1983, porno-
graphic magazine publisher Larry Flynt declared himself a presidential
67. Letter from Wallace E. Johnson, Chief, Broadcast Bureau, to Julian Bond, Atlanta
NAACP, 69 F.C.C.2d 943, 943 (1978).
68. Id. at 943-44.
69. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
70. Letter to Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944.
71. Id.; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
72. Letter to Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944.
73. In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd 2698,
para. 12, 62 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 1194, para. 12 (1987).
74. Id. paras. 10, 13.
75. Id. para. 9.
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candidate and reportedly intended to use X-rated film clips in television
ads. 6 Broadcasters asked the FCC whether or not section 315 required
them to use such ads, and an FCC staff analysis concluded that it did
not."' The Commission never formally ruled, apparently because Flynt
abandoned his attempt to run for president.7" This leaves broadcasters in
an uncomfortable position as to political ads that are obscene or inde-
cent. If they refuse to air those spots, they may be violating section 315,
according to the Broadcast Bureau letter.79 If they air them, the broad-
casters may be in violation of the prohibitions against obscene and inde-
cent broadcasts.80
IV
Conclusion
Section 315's censorship prohibition and the cases decided under it
have had salutary results. The section has advanced the cause of free
speech by forcing broadcasters to allow politicians to say whatever they
want on the air. WDA Y prevents unfairness to broadcasters by holding
that they are immune from tort liability for the broadcasts that they can-
not censor. At the same time, section 315 does not immunize offending
candidates, so victims can be compensated. Even if offending candidates
have no money, victims can sue to help clear their names.
A few problems remain, however. The defamation immunity con-
ferred by WDA Y should be made explicit in the statute, lest the five-to-
four decision be reversed by new Justices with different views. Congress
also should clarify whether stations are obligated to run political ads that
are indecent or obscene and whether stations may face punishment for
doing so.
Recent precedent exists for such congressional action. In the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Congress required large cable sys-
tems (those with thirty-six or more activated channels) to set aside some
channels for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the cable opera-
tor"i and authorized local governments to require that channels be set
76. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 793.
77. What's News-World Wide, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
78. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 793.
79. See supra text accompanying note 72.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). Congress has ordered the FCC to enforce the indecency
ban around the clock. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Re-
lated Agencies Appropriation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228
(1988). The twenty-four hour ban is being challenged in court on first amendment grounds.
See FCC Votes for Indecency Ban, BROADCASTING, July 16, 1990, at 30. Congress also has
prohibited obscene cable transmissions. See 47 U.S.C. § 559 (1988).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1988).
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aside for public, educational, or governmental use. 2 Cable operators are
prohibited from exercising any editorial control over the programming
on channels set aside pursuant to those provisions. 3 Accordingly, Con-
gress explicitly provided that cable operators shall not incur criminal or
civil liability for any program carried on any such channel.8 4 The House
of Representatives report explicitly tied the exemption from liability to
the prohibition on editorial control by cable operators. s5
A federal appeals court in a recent opinion cogently explained the
need for exemption:
Without this protection, cable operators would face a legislatively-
mandated, undeterminable exposure to both civil and criminal liabil-
ity. Faced with such a threat, operators would likely resist any forced
access, either by colluding with unobjectionable, safe programmers to
fill up the required percentage of mandatory access channels, or by
avoiding being subject to forced access by maintaining less than thirty-
six activated channels. This would defeat the basic purpose of the
mandatory access provisions by encouraging cable operators to main-
tain their monopoly over the content of programming transmitted.
With the immunity in place, however, the cable programmer's access is
more secure, since it removes a strong incentive not to grant access.86
Similar reasoning applies to the censorship prohibition of section
315. Without exemption from liability for the content of political broad-
casts, radio and television stations (and cable operators) would be forced
either to expose themselves to unlimited liability for such content or to
reject all requests from candidates for air time. Either option would be
unsavory for broadcasters, and the latter would defeat section 315's pur-
pose of giving political candidates access to broadcast media to explain
their stand on issues.8 7 Admittedly, at present, no pattern of broadcast-
82. Id. § 531(b).
83. Id. §§ 531(e), 532(c)(2). With respect to the public, educational, or governmental use,
franchising authorities and cable operators are permitted to determine that cable services that
are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the United States Constitution will not be provided or
will be provided subject to conditions. Id. §§ 531(e), 544(d).
84. Specifically, cable operators are exempted from criminal and civil liability "pursuant
to the [flederal, [s]tate, or local law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of pri-
vacy, false or misleading advertising, or other similar laws" as a result of "any program carried
on any channel designated for public, educational, [or] governmental use or on any other chan-
nel obtained under section 532 of this title or under similar arrangements." Id. § 558.
85. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4732; see Playboy Enters. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 27 (1st
Cir. 1990).
86. Playboy, 906 F.2d at 38. Congress stated that the purpose of mandatory commercial
access was "to assure that the widest possible diversity of information sources are made avail-
able to the public from cable systems in a manner consistent with the growth and development
of cable systems." 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (1988).
87. See KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922, 935 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd mem sub nom
Texas v. KVUE-TV, Inc., 465 U.S. 1092 (1984).
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ers refusing to air political commercials has arisen;"8 however, both ac-
tual and potential difficulties exist. As to defamation, broadcasters
assume that WDA Y remains viable; 9 however, without an explicit statu-
tory immunity, WDA Y could be overruled. Moreover, despite WDA Y,
broadcasters often receive legal threats from candidates who claim that
they have been defamed on the air by their opponents.' Broadcasters
could respond more simply and perhaps more persuasively to such
threats if they could cite to an explicit statutory exemption rather than a
decades-old, five-to-four court decision.9' As to indecency, most candi-
dates have no desire to offend audiences, so it is rarely a problem;92 how-
ever, lesser-known candidates have been known to resort to unorthodox
tactics, such as when Barry Commoner, a Citizens Party candidate for
president in 1980, ran radio commercials that repeatedly used the word
"bullshit." 93
Better protection for broadcasters could be accomplished by the ad-
dition of a phrase to section 315. The first sentence of subsection (a)
could then read as follows, with the proposed addition to the end of the
sentence shown in italics:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the
use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section, and shall not be subject to any civil, criminal,
or administrative sanction based on the content of such material.
Such language would make it clear to all concerned-including broad-
casters, candidates, viewers, listeners, and the FCC-that the responsibil-
ity for keeping political discourse truthful and within the bounds of
decency rests with the persons who create that discourse: politicians.
88. Some broadcasters have found it necessary to follow political ads with disclaimers
stating that the views expressed in the ads are not those of the station. The FCC has not ruled
on whether such disclaimers violate the censorship prohibition of section 315, but the Political
Programming Branch of the Enforcement Division of the Mass Media Bureau has opined that
they do not. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, Mass Media Bureau, FCC, to Wayne Brewies,
President, Southern Arkansas Radio Co., 5 FCC Rcd 4643, 4644, 67 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F)
1653, 1655-56 (1990). In a recent opinion, however, the FCC staff advised broadcasters who
choose to use such disclaimers in connection with a particular candidate's advertising that they
must do the same with all subsequent advertising on behalf of every candidate for the same
office. Id., 67 RAD. REG. 2d at 1656.
89. Telephone interview with James P. Riley, Esq., of Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, Wash-
ington, D.C., counsel for broadcasters (Aug. 22, 1990).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 57, at 793.
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